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Property Lost: Property Regained*

John E. Cribbet**
One of the most important roles of any law faculty qua faculty,
perhaps second only to reproducing themselves, is to decide what
is worth teaching in the three precious years of a formal legal
education. Not too long ago, when life, law and other things that
matter were simpler, this decision was not so difficult. Law schools
taught the law and that was that -- no law and sports, no law and
sex, no law and the global environment, etc. Today, there is so
much "law and.. ." that we are in danger of losing any common

core of knowledge that binds our graduates into a learned
profession. This is not a lament for the good old days nor a diatribe
against current trends. It is a plea that, in the rush for the trendy
new, we do not forget the key strengths of the time-tested old.
Professor Francis A. Allen makes the point with his usual
succinctness: "One of the worst things that could happen to legal
education is that the law schools should join the already-long
procession of university departments engaged in a wistful search
for a subject matter. We need not search. Our mission, as it has
been for the past eight hundred years in the universities of the
Western World, is the study of law and the institutions of the law.
Our duty is to make our thought and teaching more effective."'

*

Apologies to John Milton, whose conception of Paradise was no less nebulous than the

idea of Property. No apology to John Mortimer whose novels ParadisePostponed(1986) and Timuss
Regained (1990) deal with property matters from freedom of testation to land use controls.
**
John E. Cribbet is Chancellor, Dean, Corman Professor of Law Emeritus, ChampaignUrbana Campus, University of Illinois. In the spring quarter of 1991, he was a Distinguished Visiting
Professor at McGeorge School of Law.
1. Allen, Law, Intellect,andEducationin 57 MIchmOAN FACULTY SERIFs (1979). This series
of essays is an excellent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of American legal education.
Professor Allen speaks to all who believe in an education which is intellectually based and
humanistically motivated. He defends with penetrating insight this conception of liberal and
professional education, often attacked in recent years.
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I suspect we all agree that our end duty is to make our thought
and teaching more effective; we disagree (as well we should) about
the means to reach that end. The subject matter we teach, as
distinguished from teaching method, style and technique, is directly
related to our graduates' view of law and society. It is this view
that concerns me, if the students leave law school with a
fragmented, disjointed picture of law and the legal process,
understanding the specifics of numerous, unrelated problems but
lacking a comprehension of the "seamless web." In a broader
sense, my concern is similar to that developed in detail by Floyd
W. Matson in The Broken Image (Man, Science and Society).2 If
man's image of himself has been broken by the rapid changes in
science and technology, his view of law has been fractured by
these same (and other) developments. The reflections in the mirror
may or may not be reality but they have a powerful impact on the
way we see both ourselves and the law. Is the law all ad hoc,
power based and economics-driven or is it, at least partially, based
on reasoned social norms, with some foundation on underlying,
interrelated principles? I do not see it as an either/or proposition
and I suspect the law embodies a good bit of both philosophies.
The question is how best to make the curriculum reflect these often
self-contradictory positions so that the students will leave law
school with something of3 a common heritage rather than a
hopelessly fractured image.
Three years is world enough and time for formal legal
education, if we use the interval wisely. The "law and . . ."

2.
F. MATsON, THE BROKEN IMAGE (MAN, ScIENcE AND SocIEry) (1964) at vii. ("It is the
primary thesis of this book, then, that the historic reliance of the social sciences upon root metaphors
and routine methods appropriated from classic mechanics has eclipsed the ancestral liberal vision of

'the whole man, man in person' (to use Lewis Mumford's phrase) - and has given us instead a
radically broken self-image. The tragic history of the breaking of the human image parallels the
disintegration of the inner sense of identity, the flight from autonomous conduct to automaton
behavior, in the modem world.").
3. It is a truism that no one leaves law school with a closed briefcase of knowledge but he
or she should, at least, have a reasonable chart to provide some guidance through the maze.
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syndrome is a sensible development for many reasons, 4 provided
these advanced courses are based on a common core of knowledge.
Ah, there's the rub: is there a common core of knowledge about
the law? Clearly, we once thought so and the curricula of nearly
every law school reflected that belief. We are less sure today or
perhaps, more accurately, we are all sure in a diverse number of
ways, reflecting the fractured image. I think we do agree that the
first year of law school represents the critical pieces of the jigsaw
puzzle.5 Like every other discipline, the law has its building blocks
and one needs to understand them if the entire edifice is to make
any lasting sense. Here, I believe the conventional wisdom is
correct. Contracts, torts, property, criminal law, civil procedure, and
constitutional law comprise the essential core subjects of the allimportant first year. Of course, the content of those specific
subjects has changed over the years and will continue to evolve as
society changes but these are the ingredients that should provide
the common core of history, principle, and legal reasoning.'
Naturally, there will be widespread disagreement as to the
subjects which should comprise the first-year common core and
some will argue that it is unwise to approach the curriculum in this
way at all.7 Given bright students and an able faculty, almost any
mix will produce the right result. The common thread of
knowledge will be picked up, almost by osmosis, out of the threeyear blend. Or so the counter argument runs. Since I do not believe
in thaumaturgic formulas that will save the world (legal or
otherwise) these arguments may be sound but I think even the best
students need a more organized approach to the life-long study and

4. For example, these courses allow in-depth coverage of fairly specific subject matter, they
provide the opportunity to work in a large amount of important non-legal material, they can utilize
a wide range of teaching techniques and materials, and they tend to stimulate student interest in the
advanced years because students can self select on the basis of subject matter, etc.
5. There are numerous reasons for this uneasy agreement and there is no point in footnoting
the obvious except to stress the important fact that the students are fresh, untainted by legal
knowledge, and interested in a way most of them will never be again.
6. Notice I am not writing about how these materials are presented - socratic method,
lectures, small group discussion and papers, etc. - but about what is placed on the students'
intellectual table.
7.
One thing is clear every faculty should re-examine this issue at periodic intervals and
reach a consensus on how best to resolve the idea of a common core of knowledge.
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practice of the law. In a very real sense, most of the curriculum
could be thought of as a series of special courses in one of the
basic subject matter areas. If this is even partially true, a
convincing case can be made for full consideration of the
fundamental material before launching into the more specialized
aspects of the subject matter. It is not my purpose here to build a
case for each of the suggested core courses, but rather to
concentrate on one subject to illustrate my point. I have chosen
property not only because I know that area best but because it is
a subject that once reigned supreme, fell from grace, and may be
ascending once again.
I. PROPERTY LOST

Prior to World War II, the subject matter of property was in its
law school "hey-day." Examine almost any catalogue of that era
and you will see that about a third of the courses were property or
property related. There were many reasons for this, not least of
which was that the great legal explosion which began with the New
Deal had yet to make its influence felt in the law schools'
curricula. Moreover, it reflected what lawyers did and a large
percentage of them "did" property in one or another of its
manifestations. This is not to say that property played that large a
role in the core curriculum. Typically, personal property and estates
in land or landlord and tenant law made it into the promised land,
but the courses were fragmented, scattered throughout the three
years, and tended to lack any unifying principle. The pressure for
new courses, and the changing role of law generally, forced
faculties to take a fresh look at the student diet and to concentrate
many existing courses into new and smaller packages in order to
free time for administrative law, taxation, family law and on and
on. In the property area, Professors Casner and Leach of Harvard
led the way with the most popular property casebook of that era. 8
They combined the subject matter of six separate courses -personal property, estates in land, landlord and tenant, rights in the
8.

J. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (lst ed. 1947).
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land of another, commercial transfers of land, and an introduction
to land use controls -- into a single volume which was designed for
a two-semester, six-hour course and for enthronement in the
pantheon of the core curriculum. At about the same time,
Professors McDougal and Haber of Yale presented a quite different
set of materials which was built around the use of land. 9 The latter
book was never widely adopted as a teaching tool but it was
influential in the already developing field of land use controls. The
former casebook was widely adopted and set the pattern for
property teaching materials in the decades to follow.
This was also the era of the great, multi-volume treatises and
the American Law of Property1" and Powell on Real Property'
cornered the market on this genre of legal research and scholarly
writing. In a curious sense, these casebooks and treatises
contributed to the sense of "property lost." Like the old masters
in painting, they were so well done that the younger scholars and
teachers felt there was not much worthwhile left to be
accomplished in property and they turned their attention to
impressionistic works or to other areas entirely. If there was not
much excitement left in property research, then perhaps the subject
matter was not so basic after all (a non sequitur), and interest in
property teaching flagged to a certain extent.
Other factors contributed to the sense of "property lost" as
well. Chief among these was the changing nature of law itself and
the feeling that property had lost its own central core. No one
expressed this idea better than Professor E. F. Roberts of Cornell
who, in 1971, announced the death of property law, complete with
a well thought out obituary. 12 He turned to Blackstone for the
memorial on the tombstone: "The law of real property in this
country ... is now formed into a fine artificial system, full of

9.

M. McDouGAL & D. HABER; PROPERTY, WEALTht, LAND: AU.OCATON, PLANNING AND

DEVELOPMENT (1948). The book was subtitled Selected Cases and Other Materials on The Law of
Real Property, An Introduction.
10. L CASNER, AMERICAN LAw op PROPERTY (Casner ed. 1952) - seven volumes.
11. R. POWELL, TI LAw oF REAL PROPERTY (1949) - seven volumes.
12. See Roberts, The Demise of PropertyLaw, 57 CORNE.L L REv. 1, 3 (1971) (pronouncing
the reasons property law was losing its importance as a core requirement in law school).
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unseen connexions and nice dependencies; and he that breaks one
link of the chain, endangers the dissolution of the whole." 13
Professor Roberts then proceeded to cede portions of the newly
partitioned Blackacre to other fiefdoms. Personal property would
gravitate to commercial law, landlord-tenant to contracts, the sale
of land would become "just another aspect of the merchandizing
syndrome which typifies this society"' 4 and land use would
belong to local government, or to constitutional and administrative
law. As Professor Roberts put it: "Where does all this leave
traditional property law? Kaputt."' 5
Professor Roberts' thesis was well reasoned and, in many ways,
persuasive. This was particularly true of his lengthy discussion of
the burgeoning field of land use regulation. Here, he appeared to
agree with R. F. Babcock, one of the leading theorists and
practitioners in the subject: "Zoning law is public law .... The
treatment of zoning law as a branch of local real estate law rather
than as a branch of constitutional law . . . is largely due to the
unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to see zoning as
regulations affecting people and not just as regulations affecting
land." 6 Professor Roberts was apparently announcing the demise
of property as a separate core course in the Casner-Leach mold, not
the death of property itself. The many important issues that he
discussed must be covered somewhere in law school and it
becomes a matter of the most effective packaging of teachable
units. Others, however, have argued that the concept itself is dead.
Professor James E. Krier of Michigan has confronted this latter
argument recently in a short piece, "The (Unlikely) Death of
Property." 17 "Is property dead? Thomas Grey has argued that it
is. If he is right, we have an answer to the principal question of
this symposium panel, which asks whether regulation and property
13. Id (citing Perrin v. Blake (Ex. 1772), reprintedin, 1 F. Hargrave, A Collection of Tracts
Relative to the Law of England 487, 498 (1787)).
14. Roberts, supra, note 12, at 3.
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
16. R. BABCocK, THm ZoNiNrO GAME: MuNcIPAL PRAcncEs AND POACims 15 (1966).
17. Krier, The (Unlikely) Death of Property,13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 75 (1990). Krier's
essay was part of a Symposium on Law and Public Policy of the National Federalist Society, entitled
Property: The Founding, The Welfare State, and Beyond.
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are allies or enemies. If Professor Grey is right, they are neither -because property no longer exists. If he is wrong (as I believe he
partly is), then, I argue, regulation and property are allies and
enemies alike, and will remain so.' 8 Professor Krier concludes:
"Speaking generally, sheer uncertainty makes it difficult to imagine
a world without ideology. Speaking particularly, the ideology of
property can for this reason alone hardly be thought to have passed.
Announcements of its death are premature. Property will continue
to serve, though with ups and downs, as a vital symbol of
appropriate relationships between the individual and the state."' 19
The pattern that emerges from the late 'forties to the late
'eighties is not so much of property lost as it is of property mislaid
or abandoned. It was mislaid in the crunch of so much new
doctrine for the legal mill. It was abandoned in the sense that the
doctrines appeared to be so well settled that one need not till
deeply in the ancient soil. Many of these doctrines were complex
and confusing but they were not new and they did not change
overmuch. They were still worth teaching, but did they merit a
place in the core curriculum? Did they lack any central core of
their own so that they were simply disparate threads drawn together
to create the illusion of something called property? If the answers
to these questions were no and yes respectively, then property (the
course) was indeed lost. Oddly enough, it is land use (but is that
really property at all?) that has rekindled the spark in property lost.
Why? It is not because land use controls or land use planning, as
separate advanced courses in the curriculum, are "true" property
courses. In fact, these courses are a combination of constitutional
law, administrative law, local government, social policy and real
property. It is because these materials raise fundamental questions
about the nature of property and its place in society. They force us
to re-examine our views about the concept of private property, the
limits of state regulation and the importance of a "moderate and

18.

Il at 75.

19.

Id at 82-83.
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sufficient property" to the citizens of a relatively free society. 2"
Once we begin to delve deeply into such issues as the
"jurisprudence of taking," 21 it becomes apparent that we need to
know more about the entire institutionof property and the doctrines
that control it in the modern world. This has led to a new burst of
interest in scholarly research and writing and a concomitant desire
to transmit our ideas to the coming generations of lawyers via the
classroom.22
II. PROPERTY REGAINED

Each of the subjects in the traditional core of the first year was
included there because its mastery was thought to be an important
foundation for a well-balanced legal education. Property belonged
in the pantheon because it dealt with an institution that was vital
to all societies both in time and space.23 For reasons previously
discussed, there was some fall from grace but, as it has become
apparent that land ownership is one of the most regulated aspects
of American society, the centrality of the institution of property has
moved front and center once again. It is impossible to comprehend
the "big picture" of land use and environmental regulation without
an understanding of the institution of property and its role in
Anglo-American law. After all, land (including water) is our
second most important national asset.24 This does not mean we

20. See W. LIPPMAN, THE MErHOD OF FREEDOM at 100-02 (1934) ("But the issue between
the giant corporation and the public should not be allowed to obscure the truth that the only
dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property.").
21. See R. EPSTEiN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985). This always fascinating topic was given a new twist by the publication of Professor Richard
Epstein's provocative book.
22. Without listing the flood of law review articles, monographs, books, etc. in the land use
area, I think we can take professorial notice of this development.
23.
1 R. PowELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 7 (1976) ("The meaning of the term
institution deserves attention. It is a term applied to such different things as the church, marriage, the
money economy, democracy and property. Perhaps, in generalized language, it can be said that we
have an institution whenever we can discover a cluster of social usages from which an individual may
depart only at his peril. The result of an institution's existence is the setting of a pattern of behavior
and the fixing of a zone of tolerance for some segment of human activity.").
24. I assume that our citizens are our most important asset although we do not always act as
if either people or land were overly important.
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need a long bath in feudalism or a step by step report on property
progression from 1066 to date, but we do need to understand how
we arrived at our current destination and have some idea as to how
we should move forward into the twenty-first century.
The institution of property rests on a bundle of sticks or, at
least, generations of law students have been taught that it does. The
sticks in the bundle represent rights, but they also represent duties
(and they have done so since feudal times). It is the failure to
remember the duty aspect that accounts for some of our current
dilemmas. If we view property as primarily a matter of private
rights and public regulation as destructive of those rights, we have
forgotten the lessons of the past. In keeping the estates doctrine
while largely ignoring the obligations of the landowner, perhaps we
threw out the baby and kept the bath.' In any case, it is a role of
the property course to explore the boundary between private and
public rights as well as to delineate the rights among the owners of
individual interests. Professor Powell stated it perfectly: "So then,
the test of goodness must be some mean between the concept of
the complete dominance of the individual and the idea of the allimportance of the state." 2 The search for that "test of goodness"
has been given new impetus by recent United States Supreme Court
decisions27 in the land use area, but the responsibility of the core
property course ends rather than begins with land use controls. It
begins with an obligation to underlying concepts, to historical
development and to an understanding of how the present system
operates.
The bundle of sticks remains a good metaphor to describe
property interests. It can be used in a broad, general sense or in a
narrower, specific sense. Note how Professor Epstein uses the
analogy in the former sense: "Let me first mention what the
25. Philbrick, ChangingConceptionsof Propertyin Land, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691,710 (1938)
("The disappearance of any long established social system must involve some losses. And so, in the
case of feudalism it is regrettable that there could not have been preserved the idea that all property
was held subject to the performance of duties - not a few of them public.").
26. 1 R. POWELL, THE LAw op REAL PRoPERTY, 33 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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particular sticks in the bundle are ....The standard definitions of
property -- and these have very broad applications whether one
considers legal jargon, constitutional discourse, or the Oxford
dictionary -- tend to endow the owner of a particular thing with
three rights: possession, use and disposition." 8 In that same vein,
De.an Pound propounded six rights:
According to the civilians, property involves six rights: ajuspossidende
or right of possessing, a right in the strict sense; a jus prohibendi or
right of excluding others, also a right in the strict sense; a jus
disponendi or right of disposition, what we should now call a legal

power; ajus utendior right of using, what we should now call a liberty;
a jus fruendi or right of enjoying the fruits and profits; and a jus
abutendi or right of destroying or injuring if one likes - the two last
also what today we should call liberties. Thus at least half of the

content of a right of property is liberty - freedom of applying as one
likes, free of legal restraint.2 9

Basic property courses deal with these rights, but frequently
they do so implicitly rather than explicitly so that the student may
be tmaware of the deeper significance of a simple-appearing case.
This is unfortunate because, while the very idea of property is
imbedded in these broad rights, they become meaningful only in
the light of specific cases and statutes. Since the institution of
property is so vital in our (or any) society we need also to relate
it to the concept of justice and not see property as some separate,
abstract entity with no particular kinship to other discrete areas of
law. As Tom Bethell has noted: "Justice is intimately related to the
idea of property. I would go so far as to say that without private
property there can be no justice. In fact, an important reason for
studying law, it seems to me, should be to inquire into the
relationships between property and justice." 30
In the narrower, more specific sense, the complete bundle of
sticks translates into the fee simple absolute that can be broken

28.
29.
(1939).
30.
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Epstein, Propertyand Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POLY 2, 3 (1990).
R.Pound, The Law of PropertyandRecent JuristicThought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993,996 (197
Bethell, Introduction:PropertyandJustice, 13 HIAv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1 (1990).
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down into discrete interests that spread across the property
spectrum. This is the stuff of present and future interests, freehold
and non-freehold estates, rights in the land of another, surface,
subsurface and air rights, natural rights, vendor and purchaser,
mortgagor and mortgagee, public rights, etc. Some understanding
of this broad range of interests is necessary before one can
appreciate the full significance of regulatory takings. For example,
does the interference with any one of the sticks in the bundle
constitute a taking or should the court look at the effect on the
property as a whole in deciding whether the state has gone too
far?3 A study of the sticks in the bundle will reveal that all
property interests are subject to regulation by law, indeed are the
creatures of law as Bentham so clearly stated.32 A person may
own an easement across the land of another but, in the final
analysis, the scope and use of that easement are regulated by
legislation or by judicial decision.33 The ownership of the
easement "consists in an established expectation," an expectation
based on existing law and one on which the owner has a right to
rely. It is this element of reliance that is so important in property
law and that lies at the root of much of our disquietude about everexpanding police power controls. Perhaps a non-land use property
case will highlight the problem.
Certainty in the law is an illusion, but the law of property
does require a higher degree of stability than most other areas of
jurisprudence. It is the basis of planned activity not just a legal
response to a given set of circumstances. For example, the Supreme
Court of California recently decided Estate of Propst14 The issue
was whether a joint tenancy in personal property, such as a joint

31. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The
answer to the question helps explain the difference between the majority and minority opinions in
Penn Central and its progeny.
32. BENTAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, Part I, at 111-113
(Dumont ed., Hildreth trans. 1864) ("Property and law are born together, and die together. Before
laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.... The idea of
property consists in an established expectation ....").
33. See Annotation, Scope of PrescriptiveEasementforAccess (Easementof Way), 79 A.L.R.
4th 604, 645-65 (explaining the scope of prescriptive easements) (1990).
34. 50 Cal. 3d 448, 788 P.2d 628, 268 Cal. Rptr. 114, (Cal. 1990).

103

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
bank account, could be severed by the unilateral action of one joint
tenant.35 Under the common law, a joint tenant could so sever
either real or personal property, but California had long held that
a joint tenant was powerless to defeat the right of survivorship by
unilaterally severing a joint tenancy in personal property. The
Supreme Court returned to first principles, reversed the special
California position and held the new rule would be given
retroactive effect unless the party claiming a right of survivorship
could prove that the application of the holding would cause that
party substantial detriment as a result of the party's reasonable
reliance on the prior rule.36
The Court's opinion is undoubtedly sound but the retroactive
effect raises the kind of question which now concerns us. Justice
Broussard, concurring and dissenting, wrote: "When, as here, we
reject a well-established rule that lacked a sound theoretical basis
but caused little confusion or dispute, we should make every effort
not to make the cure worse than the disease. It is almost as
important that property law be predictable as that it be right.
When we break with the past in a retroactive opinion, but make
substantial reliance on the old rule an affirmative defense we
inevitably engender a far larger volume of litigation than the old
rule created. I would prefer to make our opinion take effect
prospectively, since I believe this is the only way to cause less
disruption and litigation than was caused by the rule we now
37
reject.'1
Property law does need to be relatively predictable, else how
can an owner have a meaningful "established expectation"? The
thrust of most branches of property law is in the direction of
predictability, hence the calculus of estates, the Statute of Frauds,
the recording system, etc. Of course, there are no vested rights in
the zoning status of a tract of land (nor should there be) but at least
an owner should be able to rely on an existing use status until the

35.
Ld.at 451,788 P.2d at 629, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
36. Id at 462, 788 P.2d at 636, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
37. Id. at 467, 788 P.2d at 639, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (emphasis added).
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local government can show that a change is necessary to satisfy a
vital and pressing governmental interest. To the extent that police
power controls are exercised in an ad hoc fashion with no real
relationship to a sensible plan, the law itself falls into disrepute. It
is this search for predictability that provides the fodder for much
of the land use controversy.
These comments are not meant as an essay on land use. Rather
they are intended to show why that subject has revitalized the basic
property area and led to property regained. By focusing attention
on some of the broader issues inherent in private property, land use
has helped clarify why the institutionof property is so fundamental
an aspect of society. Lawyers have many and, indeed, expanding
roles in modem America but surely one of them is to continue their
historical involvement in the property system. That system can be
improved and made to function for the benefit of all of the people
only if it is reasonably well understood, warts and all. As Professor
Powell has pointed out there is an opportunity and a need for
statesmanship in this branch of the law as well as in others.
I][.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the legal profession is changing rapidly and that
lawyers are playing an ever-increasing role in all of American
society. It is likely that the same thing will be true of countries in
the communist bloc as they move toward a different property
system and a greater infusion of freedom for the individual. This
places a greater burden than ever on legal education and creates a
special challenge for the current generation of law professors. The
law school programs are almost certain to be scrutinized, inside and
out, more intensively than ever before. Programs inherited from
previous generations will need to be justified anew in the light of
the approaching twenty-first century. While I am concerned about
the total law school program and have addressed that matter
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elsewhere," my comments here are more restrictive. I believe
there should be a core curriculum for the all-important first year of
law school and that property should be a component of that core.
If property has been lost then property has been (or should be)
regained. Blackstone was partially right. "There is nothing which
so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
Well, at least he was
mankind, as the right of property ....
right so far as property professors are concerned!

38. Cribbet, The Changeless, Ever-ChangingUniversity: The Role ofthe LawSchool,26ARIZ.
L REV. 241 (1984). This article is from an address delivered for the Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture
Series at the University of Arizona Law School while the author was Chancellor of the UrbanaChampaign Campus of the University of Illinois.
39. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws oF ENGLAND. Book II, Chap. 1, at 2 (15th
ed. 1909).
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